Rec'd this from my negotiations prof. at Harvard, Mike Watkins. Worth reprinting in full. Updated 10/8/02:
Is the Bush Administration sensibly committed to reining in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or is it over-committed to the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime regardless of the cost? As machinations continue at the UN and preparations for a Is the Bush administration willing to take "yes" for an answer on inspections? Or is this all window dressing on the rocky road to regime change?
Let's start with the administration-is-sensibly-committed scenario. Suppose that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction pose such an imminent threat to U.S. interests that we simply cannot afford to wait for the inspections to take place. Suppose that even if the inspectors uncover evidence of a program or are blocked, it will be too late, because Hussein will have reached some critical new threshold of weapons capability (presumably the nuclear one because he has had chemical and biological weapons for a long time) or transfer them terrorists. Suppose that Hussein has the capability to fool the inspectors, at least for long enough to reach this new threshold.
If the best available evidence truly supports this view, then on to Baghdad and damn the consequences. Under this scenario, the Bush administration would be sensibly committed to taking on Iraq. It would be a rational decision made with full knowledge of the potential consequences for the stability of key allies in the region (Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the struggle with al Qaeda, and the health of the U.S. economy. As a "realist," I would support immediate war.
But suppose that the best available evidence doesn't support this view. Suppose that the Iraqi regime, while thoroughly detestable, is not going to achieve significant new capabilities in the time it takes for inspections to be tried. Suppose there is no evidence of imminent transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Suppose that war with Iraq is likely to have highly negative impacts on the region and divert attention away from the fight with al Qaeda. Suppose that an imminent U.S. attack could even act as the trigger for the Iraqis to transfer weapons to terrorists or to try to use them on Israel. Why would the administration pursue such a dangerous course of action? Why would it not embrace the Iraqi capitulation with gusto, declare interim victory, and press for the most rapid and thorough possible inspections?
The answer is that key people in the administration could be irrationally over-committed to the destruction of Hussein's regime and so unwilling to accept any other outcome. Is there evidence in the behavior of the administration that this may be the case? Unfortunately, there is.
How can we distinguish between sensible commitment and irrational over-commitment? Lots of good work on the psychology of conflict has provided a characteristic list of symptoms of the latter.
One symptom of over-commitment is intense personalization of the situation. People who are over-committed come to see the stakes in a conflict in dangerously personal terms. President Bush's recent comment that Hussein is the "guy that tried to kill my dad" is certainly suggestive of this.
A second symptom is high ego stakes in being right. There is reason to be concerned that this is the case for the "hawks" within the administration. They have essentially staked their power and prestige on ridding the world of Saddam Hussein. They came to power determined to take on Iraq. They saw it as their test case for their philosophy of preemptive power projection; their chance to prove how wrong those mealy-mouthed multilateralists were about the world. Failure to achieve that goal would represent a major defeat for them, their philosophy, and their base of power in the making of foreign policy.
A third symptom of over-commitment is total preoccupation with the issue to the exclusion of other important issues. In the emotional aftermath of 9/11, key officials in the administration almost immediately sought to link Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction programs first to Al Qaeda. When no connection could be found, they evoked a more nebulous transfer-weapons-to-terrorist threat. This appears dangerously like a search for a rationale, any rationale to justify a course of action already decided upon.
A fourth symptom is devaluation of concessions. When the other side makes a concession in this case apparent acceptance of unfettered inspections it simply cannot be genuine. It has to be a trick, a trap, or a sign of weakness. So the right course of action is to press on even harder. In this vein, the administration's insistence on a very tough new resolution appears calculated to set up hurdles that Iraq can't meet.
A fifth symptom is self-serving illusions. When people are over-committed, they systematically minimize the risks associated with their preferred course of action and inflate the risks associated with alternative courses of actions. Vice President Cheney's statements that it will be easy to defeat Iraq and that the dangers of "doing nothing" (which in this case means continuing the hard work of containment) are too great, certainly merits concern. A related tendency is to discount the future: putting far too much weight on achieving near term gains (ridding the world of Saddam Hussein) and far too little weight on long term costs (creating new terrorists, destabilizing friendly governments).
A sixth and final symptom is the suppression of internal dissent. People who are over-committed not only treat opposing opinions with distain, painting them weak or naïve, they actively work to suppress internal debate in the name of maintaining "a united front." The administration's treatment of Congress certainly smacks of this. When suggestions that the administration would act on Iraq without consulting Congress drew sharp bipartisan criticism, what happened? The administration essentially made support for a pre-election resolution on Iraq into a test of patriotism in time of war. Subsequently, President Bush accused Senate opponents of his homeland security plan of being "not interested in the security of the American people." And so legitimate expressions of concern, even among Congressional Republicans, are being suppressed. The hawks appear not to like multilateralism in any form, including the Congressional one.
Given the potential costs of being wrong in this rapidly escalating situation, it is imperative that we be sure that the administration is sensibly committed and not irrationally overcommitted. This means focusing attention back on the case for action now and the associated costs and benefits. In the midst of all the rhetoric about broken promises and the "stiffing" of the world community, I have yet to hear the compelling case for immediate war. And I suspect I'm not alone.
Michael Watkins is an Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School where is does research on negotiation and international conflict. He is the co-author of Breakthrough International Negotiation: How Great Negotiators Transformed the World's Toughest Post-Cold War Conflicts, which won the CPR Institute's 2001 prize for best book in the field of conflict resolution.
| Iraq | WMD | War | Wadministration | George W. Bush |
