http://www.foreignfilms.com/films/1603.asp?search=1&stype=0
Medea for...the reason for the rule of law. The Callas version--what happens when passion isn't sublimated.

Justice? What about To Kill a Mockingbird?

Lord of the Flies: I'd go with the 1960 (ish) version, because none of the kids were professional actors--more moving, to me.

Religion, you say?

Religion & the state: Man for All Seasons is a good film experience...

High Noon: a man, his community, and the cost

Nature of Justice: 12 Angry Men

Mmmm why communities need laws; one of the Spaghetti Westerns or http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0054047/ the Magnificent Seven

ok, that's a start. I cannot think of a movie that would address the transition from superstition to more rational thinking.

And, as we discussed in the car, "Groundhog Day." Debbie, do you have that link for that list of "philosophical movies"?

A Man for all Seasons is my wife's favorite movie. She often cites it as the reason she became a lawyer. One of my favorite movies, which hits on your themes, is Inherit the Wind - a fictionalized account of the Scopes Monkey Trial. Puts these questions in an early twentieth century context though, so maybe too modern.

On religion and the state, Antigone. Compare as many versions as possible, from Sophocles to Anouilh (god, have I spelled that right?), and Steiner's essay.

"ok, that's a start. I cannot think of a movie that would address the transition from superstition to more rational thinking."

Zardoz, maybe?

If you're discussing the nature of truth you have to show Rashomon.

"I cannot think of a movie that would address the transition from superstition to more rational thinking."

Maybe Zardoz?

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

Sounds like an excellant course .

Incidentally, if one is interested in a forum that discusses philosophy one might wish to visit the forums page of a Internet site known as the Journal Of The Intelllectual Barbarian at the following internet address: http://www.intellectualbarbarian.com/prod/xoops-2.0.2/html/modules/news/
When one gets to the first page of the Journal Of The Intellectual Barbarian then one should click on the Forums page .

Mentioning this is NOT to detract viewers from Ishbadiddle . Ishbadiddle is an excellant site and I do NOT wish to steal viewers from Ishbaddiddle .

POSTSCRIPT TO MESSAGE ABOVE

My server, or some aspect of the computer apparently malfunctioned, and caused the message above to duplicate.

If anyone is wishing to post to the Journal of the Intellectual Babrarian ---when they come to the forums page they should insert the very word: password, itself in the slot that asks for password . The word :password, is itself the password.

FIXING A BOONDOGGLE

A lot of conrudrums and boondoggles in the area of philosophical study could be fixed by the following precising definitions for existence and being ----which are all too often used as if they were interchangeable terms .

EXISTENCE: All that which can be distinctly thought of if even in a rudimentary sense--- all that is an object for thought . This would include those items which subsist only in minds, as well as also those items which have some spatial extention .

BEING : A subset of the META-category of Existence. The subset that is limited to all items that *in addition* to being able to be thought about *also* have extention in some form of space .

POSTSCRIPT TO EXISTENCE AND BEING

It's important to keep in mind that the precising definition in the brief essay shown above is exactly that: a precising definition---NOT a redefinition . Redefinitions are wrongheaded and, hence, a no-no for they try to make language open ended and hence meaningless ---or to put the matter in a similar fashion : post-meaningful.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE BRIEF ESSAY ON EXISTENCE AND BEING

It's important to keep in mind that the precising definition in the brief essay above is exactly that: a precising definition. It is NOT a redefinition . Redefinitions are always wrongheaded, and, hence, a no-no . Redefinitions foster open-endedness and, hence, are an obstacle to meaningfulness. Redefinitions---which are DIFFERENT THAN precising definitions---cause dialogue to go towards becoming meaningless---or what might be called post-meaningful---which is of course very bad!

POSTSCRIPT TO THE BRIEF ESSAY ON EXISTENCE AND BEING

It's important to keep in mind that the precising definition in the brief essay above is exactly that: a precising definition. It is NOT a redefinition . Redefinitions are always wrongheaded, and, hence, a no-no . Redefinitions foster open-endedness and, hence, are an obstacle to meaningfulness. Redefinitions---which are DIFFERENT THAN precising definitions---cause dialogue to go towards becoming meaningless---or what might be called post-meaningful---which is of course very bad!

HE STOOPS TO FALTER

There is a contemporary philosopher who wrote a beautiful essay which debunks a particular version of relativism known as ANTI-foundationalism .

ANTI-foundationalism is a particular twist on relativism . Relativism is the ANTI-intellectual and ANTI-philosophical and wrongheaded ideology (which pervades and characterizes the MTV Generation) which would mislead people into thinking that somehow supposedly there is only opinions instead of absolute truth . The particular movement known as ANTI-foundationalism (which is promoted in the academic world by people like Richard Rorty, Bruce Aune, Peter Suber and others of that ilk) ----is a version of relativism which claims that somehow we should supposedly somehow believe that any ultimate precepts or first principles of philosophy must have to be justified in turn by other principles which in turn must be justified by other principles ect in a regress that goes on forever or run the risk of being themselves unjustifiable . The ANTI-foundationalists go on to allege that if the first principles themselves have no prior principles to justify them than they cannot justify any beliefs that are derived from them .

Contemporary philosopher Matthias Steup has written a beautiful essay that demonstrates how wrong the claim of the ANTI-foundationalist is . In the essay titled : 'FOUNDATIONALISM, SENSE-EXPERIENTAL-CONTENT, AND SELLARS' DILEMMA' , Matthias Steup demonstrates that, for the aspect of Foundationalism which concerns sensation, there certainly is an indisputable, absolute foundation which can epistemically justify belief even if the foundation itself is not subject to epistemic justification .

The bottom line is that when someone has a sense perception with one of their five senses of some experience seeming to have a particular quality then this sense perception has what is called *propositional content* even if the sense perception itself is not a proposition . The propositional content in a sense perception is the forerunner of an actual proposition though it is not itself a proposition . The propositional content of a sense perception can thus serve as an ultimate foundation for a proposition that is later discovered in regard to the original sense perception .

As Matthias Steup points out in the essay, the propositional content of the sense perception is indisputable , infalliable in *seeming* to be a particular way . Whether the physical referent for the sense perception which *seems* to have that quality is actually like that or whether the sensation is an illusion is another matter . In the example Matthias Steup gives in the essay, a person can have no grounds for disputing the notion that a beverage *seems* to taste sweet, when they themselves drink, it if it seems to taste sweet . That person can, however, have reasonable grounds for disputing whether the beverage they are drinking itself really is sweet----for perhaps there is a factor that has altered their tastebuds . Yet it is worth explaining again that it makes no sense for a person to claim they have grounds for doubting that the beverage *seems* to taste sweet when they themselves report that it seems to taste sweet . That it *seems* to taste sweet is infallible . Seemings are NOT themselves subject to warranted doubts. Whether what seems to be corresponds to what is actual is subject to reasonable doubt. The experience of it *seeming* to be is NOT subject to such doubt. To quote Matthias Steup himself, "...experiental states simply are not the kind of things that can be justified or unjustified . Yet they can play the role of justifiers because they have propositional content."

CLOSING COMMENTS

That a particular sensory experience seems to be a particular way when any given person experiences it as seeming to be that way (in a way that they could report in even the most basic of terms either to another or within the internal dialogue of their own minds) ...is a kind of thinking .

The evaluations as to whether such sensory experience is merely an illusion or whether it corresponds to something actual is meta-thinking . BIG DIFFERENCE !

It was quite sad to see the learned philosopher Matthias Steup in the footnotes to the essay : 'FOUNDATIONALISM, SENSE-EXPERIENTAL DATA, AND SELLARS' DILEMMA' oddly downplay what he had written in the main of the essay and claim that what he had written was somewhat mistaken . The irony was that he was mistaken about having been mistaken----or to put it in less long-winded terms: HE HAD IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME !

In footnote (11) , Matthias Steup wrote ,

"Beliefs---the paradigm states that admit of epistemic justification---necessarily involve assent to a proposition.But sense experiences do not .For when we suspect our senses to deceive us, we do not assent to the proposition that is the content of our sense experiental state. Consequently, sense experiences are unlike beliefs, and thus do not admit of epistemic justification .Unfortunately, this argument is no good. After all suspension of judgement admits of epistemic justification as much as belief. Therefore, the point that sense experience does not always involve assent to a proposition does not establish that it does not admit of epistemic justification ."

Of course the reader may at this time be asking : WHAT IS THIS FOOTNOTE ALL ABOUT ? Well in the footnote , Matthias Steup is wrongly claiming that the essay he wrote was mistaken when he had it right the first time. He claims that suspending judgement as to whether a sensation corresponds fully to an actual item that actually has that quality which it seems to have is a choice which taints the propositional content of that sensation and somehow makes it into a belief among beliefs . Thus if the content of the sensation is a belief among beliefs then were stuck again with the old problem of how it can be justified . However, Matthias Steup makes a suprising error in this footnote in that he supposes that a suspending of judgement takes place at the level of the original reporting of the sense experience. To be accurate about the topic we should say that in the original report of how the sensation seems the person in originally registering how the sensation seems to be, is neither saying ultimately that the sensation does correspond to some actual item , nor is he saying that it does not correspond to some actual item, nor is he saying that he even suspends judgement as to whether it corresponds to anm actual item . All three of those evaluations: (1).saying it does correspond to an actual item (2).saying it doesn't correspond to an actual item (3). suspending judgement as to whether it corresponds or not to an actual item are evaluations that happen AFTER the experience of what the sensation seems like takes place . In the footnote Matthias Steup puts the cart in place of the proverbial horse.

In the footnote he overlooks that the decision to suspend judgement as to whether the sense experience reflects the actual is an abstraction that takes places at the level of meta-thinking. The initial experience of how the sensation seems to be takes place at the level of thinking . The meta-thinking which evaluates the thinking is a commentary on the thinking. The evaluative questions as to whether the way that the sensation seems to be reflects that which actual is, or whether instead the way it seems to be is an illusion, or whether one should even suspend judgement are questions that are asked at the level of meta-thinking. They are NOT asked at the level of thinking where the propositional content of the sense experience is first registered !

So in footnote (11) wherein Matthias Steup states, "Unfortunately this argument is no good" ----Matthias Steup is wrong about the argument being no good . He had it right the first time and, thus, there is in principle, a foundation for beliefs about sensation which can justify even though it is not within the the arena of being justified or not .

One of the places where one can read the original fascinating essay by Matthias Steup is at the website: Epistemology Papers By Subject .

HE STOOPS TO FALTER

There is a contemporary philosopher who wrote a beautiful essay which debunks a particular version of relativism known as ANTI-foundationalism .

ANTI-foundationalism is a particular twist on relativism . Relativism is the ANTI-intellectual and ANTI-philosophical and wrongheaded ideology (which pervades and characterizes the MTV Generation) which would mislead people into thinking that somehow supposedly there is only opinions instead of absolute truth . The particular movement known as ANTI-foundationalism (which is promoted in the academic world by people like Richard Rorty, Bruce Aune, Peter Suber and others of that ilk) ----is a version of relativism which claims that somehow we should supposedly somehow believe that any ultimate precepts or first principles of philosophy must have to be justified in turn by other principles which in turn must be justified by other principles ect in a regress that goes on forever or run the risk of being themselves unjustifiable . The ANTI-foundationalists go on to allege that if the first principles themselves have no prior principles to justify them than they cannot justify any beliefs that are derived from them .

Contemporary philosopher Matthias Steup has written a beautiful essay that demonstrates how wrong the claim of the ANTI-foundationalist is . In the essay titled : 'FOUNDATIONALISM, SENSE-EXPERIENTAL-CONTENT, AND SELLARS' DILEMMA' , Matthias Steup demonstrates that, for the aspect of Foundationalism which concerns sensation, there certainly is an indisputable, absolute foundation which can epistemically justify belief even if the foundation itself is not subject to epistemic justification .

The bottom line is that when someone has a sense perception with one of their five senses of some experience seeming to have a particular quality then this sense perception has what is called *propositional content* even if the sense perception itself is not a proposition . The propositional content in a sense perception is the forerunner of an actual proposition though it is not itself a proposition . The propositional content of a sense perception can thus serve as an ultimate foundation for a proposition that is later discovered in regard to the original sense perception .

As Matthias Steup points out in the essay, the propositional content of the sense perception is indisputable , infalliable in *seeming* to be a particular way . Whether the physical referent for the sense perception which *seems* to have that quality is actually like that or whether the sensation is an illusion is another matter . In the example Matthias Steup gives in the essay, a person can have no grounds for disputing the notion that a beverage *seems* to taste sweet, when they themselves drink, it if it seems to taste sweet . That person can, however, have reasonable grounds for disputing whether the beverage they are drinking itself really is sweet----for perhaps there is a factor that has altered their tastebuds . Yet it is worth explaining again that it makes no sense for a person to claim they have grounds for doubting that the beverage *seems* to taste sweet when they themselves report that it seems to taste sweet . That it *seems* to taste sweet is infallible . Seemings are NOT themselves subject to warranted doubts. Whether what seems to be corresponds to what is actual is subject to reasonable doubt. The experience of it *seeming* to be is NOT subject to such doubt. To quote Matthias Steup himself, "...experiental states simply are not the kind of things that can be justified or unjustified . Yet they can play the role of justifiers because they have propositional content."

CLOSING COMMENTS

That a particular sensory experience seems to be a particular way when any given person experiences it as seeming to be that way (in a way that they could report in even the most basic of terms either to another or within the internal dialogue of their own minds) ...is a kind of thinking .

The evaluations as to whether such sensory experience is merely an illusion or whether it corresponds to something actual is meta-thinking . BIG DIFFERENCE !

It was quite sad to see the learned philosopher Matthias Steup in the footnotes to the essay : 'FOUNDATIONALISM, SENSE-EXPERIENTAL DATA, AND SELLARS' DILEMMA' oddly downplay what he had written in the main of the essay and claim that what he had written was somewhat mistaken . The irony was that he was mistaken about having been mistaken----or to put it in less long-winded terms: HE HAD IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME !

In footnote (11) , Matthias Steup wrote ,

"Beliefs---the paradigm states that admit of epistemic justification---necessarily involve assent to a proposition.But sense experiences do not .For when we suspect our senses to deceive us, we do not assent to the proposition that is the content of our sense experiental state. Consequently, sense experiences are unlike beliefs, and thus do not admit of epistemic justification .Unfortunately, this argument is no good. After all suspension of judgement admits of epistemic justification as much as belief. Therefore, the point that sense experience does not always involve assent to a proposition does not establish that it does not admit of epistemic justification ."

Of course the reader may at this time be asking : WHAT IS THIS FOOTNOTE ALL ABOUT ? Well in the footnote , Matthias Steup is wrongly claiming that the essay he wrote was mistaken when he had it right the first time. He claims that suspending judgement as to whether a sensation corresponds fully to an actual item that actually has that quality which it seems to have is a choice which taints the propositional content of that sensation and somehow makes it into a belief among beliefs . Thus if the content of the sensation is a belief among beliefs then were stuck again with the old problem of how it can be justified . However, Matthias Steup makes a suprising error in this footnote in that he supposes that a suspending of judgement takes place at the level of the original reporting of the sense experience. To be accurate about the topic we should say that in the original report of how the sensation seems the person in originally registering how the sensation seems to be, is neither saying ultimately that the sensation does correspond to some actual item , nor is he saying that it does not correspond to some actual item, nor is he saying that he even suspends judgement as to whether it corresponds to anm actual item . All three of those evaluations: (1).saying it does correspond to an actual item (2).saying it doesn't correspond to an actual item (3). suspending judgement as to whether it corresponds or not to an actual item are evaluations that happen AFTER the experience of what the sensation seems like takes place . In the footnote Matthias Steup puts the cart in place of the proverbial horse.

In the footnote he overlooks that the decision to suspend judgement as to whether the sense experience reflects the actual is an abstraction that takes places at the level of meta-thinking. The initial experience of how the sensation seems to be takes place at the level of thinking . The meta-thinking which evaluates the thinking is a commentary on the thinking. The evaluative questions as to whether the way that the sensation seems to be reflects that which actual is, or whether instead the way it seems to be is an illusion, or whether one should even suspend judgement are questions that are asked at the level of meta-thinking. They are NOT asked at the level of thinking where the propositional content of the sense experience is first registered !

So in footnote (11) wherein Matthias Steup states, "Unfortunately this argument is no good" ----Matthias Steup is wrong about the argument being no good . He had it right the first time and, thus, there is in principle, a foundation for beliefs about sensation which can justify even though it is not within the the arena of being justified or not .

One of the places where one can read the original fascinating essay by Matthias Steup is at the website: Epistemology Papers By Subject .

AMBIGUITY IS BANAL

There is NO act more banal than tolerating ambiguity. It's weird that some people think that tolerating ambiguity is liberating. Tolerating ambiguity is NOT poetic it does not make for spice in life, it is NOT liberating .Tolerating ambiguity makes for a kafakenesque nightmare where any affirmation of value is ultimately betrayed and life becomes anti-climatic/without any standard of accountability ----PLASTIC AND, hence, phony !

Distinct ideas ---as Descartes called them ---now they are truely liberating .

Of course it is important that we realize what is NOT ambiguity. Qualifying a statement in the course of a discussion or argument is *NOT* ambiguity. It is quite backwards and weird that some people have claimed that qualifying an argument is somehow ambiguity. qualifying an argument by thin distinctions is NOT ambiguity.

It is when people do NOT make qualifications----it is when they gloss over thin distinctions ----or merely pretend to qualify but subtily sidestep the focus of the question-- that is when they are guilty of ambiguity.

NEVER FORGET the fundamental truth: IT IS A LAZY MIND WHICH *REFUSES* TO SPLIT HAIRS .Splitting hairs is good, one can never have too much accuracy . What some call "overanalyzing" is a damn good practice !

We should always go to great rigid lengths to avoid what the writer William Stafford called "the small betrayal in the mind,the shrug that makes the fragile sequence break"

Lateral thinking/equivocation in thought is always wrong ---these days it helps to state what should have been obvious to all concerned long ago .

AMBIGUITY IS BANAL

There is NO act more banal than tolerating ambiguity. It's weird that some people think that tolerating ambiguity is liberating. Tolerating ambiguity is NOT poetic it does not make for spice in life, it is NOT liberating .Tolerating ambiguity makes for a kafakenesque nightmare where any affirmation of value is ultimately betrayed and life becomes anti-climatic/without any standard of accountability ----PLASTIC AND, hence, phony !

Distinct ideas ---as Descartes called them ---now they are truely liberating .

Of course it is important that we realize what is NOT ambiguity. Qualifying a statement in the course of a discussion or argument is *NOT* ambiguity. It is quite backwards and weird that some people have claimed that qualifying an argument is somehow ambiguity. qualifying an argument by thin distinctions is NOT ambiguity.

It is when people do NOT make qualifications----it is when they gloss over thin distinctions ----or merely pretend to qualify but subtily sidestep the focus of the question-- that is when they are guilty of ambiguity.

NEVER FORGET the fundamental truth: IT IS A LAZY MIND WHICH *REFUSES* TO SPLIT HAIRS .Splitting hairs is good, one can never have too much accuracy . What some call "overanalyzing" is a damn good practice !

We should always go to great rigid lengths to avoid what the writer William Stafford called "the small betrayal in the mind,the shrug that makes the fragile sequence break"

Lateral thinking/equivocation in thought is always wrong ---these days it helps to state what should have been obvious to all concerned long ago .

SOME MISCELLANEOUS INSIGHTS

One insight that has been amplified lately is a precising definition on what it means to know a specific item of knowledge .

Well here's the condensed version : to know a given item x is to know that x *instead of not x or y or z is the case . The constrastive (the notion of contrast) is implicit in each specific act of knowing FROM THE BEGINNING point of knowing ! The contrastive can be said to supervene (that's a nifty word that anayltic philosophers often invoke and which is quite useful here) on the propositional content of the postive content of the act of knowing !

So here's a breakthrough to solve a boondoggle in epistemology (the study of what it means to know) ...

This will help to solve that old nasty Gettier problem .

Now on to other topics .

One of the most equivocated words in the English language is the word reason .

The problem with the English language is that the english language is one where weirdly enough the same word will be used to stand for different meanings . This lends itself to the ugly tendency of people to try and mix contexts that are separate . The word 'reason' can be used to (1) signify a *purpose* or (2) to signify a cause for an event but a cause that is NOT necessarily a purposeful cause . The word 'reason' can also be used to stand for (3) having a motive for doing /or thinking or saying some though or act and (4) the often different context of having *grounds* (which is to say, justification) for doing/ or thinking/ or saying some thought or act. Each of these contexts are quite separate . Yet in this present bizarre era of history ----there are a lot of people --apparently--who try to mix context (1) and the quite separate context (2) when they say with glib smugness and wrongheadedness that "everything happens for a reason" . Just because every event has a cause does NOT mean that every event serves a purpose. Some events indeed are just by chance. The temperature of winter air and water on a tree branch may, for example, be the "reason" --as in cause for ice falling off a tree and hitting somebody on the head if they walk by . But that does NOT mean that the person getting hit on the head happened for some mysterious divine purpose that was predestined by God for some unknowable "reason" ----as some people that believe the weird doctrine that CLAIMS that tragic events are predestined by God for some unknowable purpose as some people weirdly believe---a doctrine that is , by the way, insulting to God and NO where clearly taught by the Bible .

There is another weird tendency of people to mix the separate uses of the word reason as in reason (3) having a motive ----regardless of whether one has grounds for that motive for saying or thinking or doing some expression and (4) having *grounds (aka justification ---for the expression . Reason in the sense of (3) and reason in the sense of (4) are also quite separate and should NEVER be mixed in a discussion, either .

FIXING A TYPO

In the brief essay shown above there are a couple of typographical errors . Most of them are minor, like leaving out one of the ) symbols when I intended to put a phrase in parenthesis .

The one major typo I'd like most of all to fix for the sake of avoiding a misunderstanding by the reader is that there is a sentence above that should have been posted as follows : 'Well here's the condensed version: to know x is to know x is the case *instead* of knowing NOT x is the case (or y or z is the case) .

Sometimes placing the parenthesis in the right place can make all the difference in making a phrase or sentence clearer to the reader.

Also the phrase 'as some people believe' was duplicated an extra time unnecessarily which makes the sentence in one of the near last paragraphs in the essay above a bit awkward in terms of rythmn .

FIXING A TYPO

In the brief essay shown above there are a couple of typographical errors . Most of them are minor, like leaving out one of the ) symbols when I intended to put a phrase in parenthesis .

The one major typo I'd like most of all to fix for the sake of avoiding a misunderstanding by the reader is that there is a sentence above that should have been posted as follows : 'Well here's the condensed version: to know x is to know x is the case *instead* of knowing NOT x is the case (or y or z is the case) .

Sometimes placing the parenthesis in the right place can make all the difference in making a phrase or sentence clearer to the reader.

Also the phrase 'as some people believe' was duplicated an extra time unnecessarily which makes the sentence in one of the near last paragraphs in the essay above a bit awkward in terms of rythmn .